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SHOP FLOOR 
ORGANISATION
Some experiences from the vehicle industry1
by Gerry Phelan
i>
For wage- and salary-earners involved in 
vehicle assembly, class is not a dead issue. It 
does not present itself as an intellectual 
p ro b le m , as a m a t te r  o f  the nice 
determination of class boundaries, and it is 
not a subject that would normally be 
discussed over lunch. Rather does class 
present itself as an expression of the 
experience of living human beings. That 
„ experience is a day-by-day event, five days a 
.v'C'0' week, of routine activity which yields a pay 
packet which in turn gives them access to life, 
to the pleasures outside work. In a normal 
working day the dominant activity is work, 
preparing for work and travelling to and from c 
work. There is little choice about the work: 
what is done is done for others, the way they 
want it, at the quality and at the rate they set.
For an assembler, there’s no room for 
creativity. The mind is separated from the 
body. Doing the job requires the body not the 
mind, and so the mind just exists. There are 
times though, in some of these routine days, 
when the mind does link up with the body. At 
such times, for those involved, mind and body 
become alive — the plant becomes alive. It is 
an industrial action that the two are fused.
The power of the employer is felt in the 
daily work-routine and felt just as much when 
industrial action is being used to improve 
some aspect of that routine. There is some 
power up there, and the workers don’t have it. 
That is to say, normally they d o n ’t have it. But 
when, collectively, the workers become 
determined to change something, they 
become powerful. Power then is, apparently, 
a conditional thing. It resides where it does 
because everybody concerned considers it 
right and proper that it should. It is a 
collection of daily practices and thoughts 
about these practices which express the class 
character of the relations between those 
involved in the vehicle industry.
The object of this essay is to detail some of 
the specifics of class relations2 and to 
highlight the importance of workers’ 
organisation on the shop-floor as a flexible 
and effective tool in their mediation. The 
focus throughout will be on the people at the 
workshop floor to try to understand 
something of their daily working life and 
some of the responses they make to it. Other 
important details will be mentioned only
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where they serve tha t purpose. Therefore little 
attention will be paid to the structure of the 
industry or the manner in which the main 
working-class institutions (the trade unions) 
interact at the state or federal level with the 
employers inside or outside the Arbitration 
Commission.
II
The o v e r - r id in g  m an a g e m e n t  c o n ­
sideration in vehicle-manufacturing and 
assembly plants is that actual production 
should meet the targeted production level on 
any given day. It is the target level in 
combination with the division of labour 
which is the bane of existence of the vehicle 
assembler. The assembly line, which usually 
attracts the blame for the problems of the 
industry, is merely the scapegoat. By focusing 
on the technology of the line attention is 
diverted away from the social system of the 
factory, of who controls whom to do what, 
when and how. The assembly line, which is a 
te ch n o log ica lly  p r im it iv e  m echan ism , 
facilitiates that control. It does so by precisely 
locating, and limiting the mobility of, the 
assembly workers within the plant and 
specifying the universal minimum rate at 
which they work. The target affects workers 
in the manufacturing plants too. For 
example, the target at Broadmeadows 
determines the daily output of the presses 
producing sheet-metal body panels miles 
away at F o rd ’s Geelong plant. A loaded train 
leaves Geelong each night to arrive at 
Broadmeadows by the following morning. 
One plant is dominated by assembly lines and 
the other is not.
The target
Both are dominated by the target. The 
power of the target is not confined to the 
plants of the major companies. The vehicle 
industry is characterised by a large number of 
sm a ll  s a te l l i t e  c o m p a n ie s  s u p p ly in g  
components to the industry such as wheel 
rims, wiring harnesses and bumper bars. 
Although they may be geographically remote 
from the assembly plants the target reaches 
out and touches them too.
The greater the division of labour the
smaller the task; the smaller the task the 
smaller the amount of time needed to 
complete it and the faster the assembly line 
can be driven. But with smaller tasks more 
people are needed to produce the finished 
article hence greater division of labour, faster 
line speeds, longer lines, larger workforces 
and bigger factories tend to go together. And 
so it is that at Broadmeadows in Victoria 
some 3300 people, typically, produce some 
350 vehicles per day on a job-cycle time of 
about l '/2 minutes whereas a t the West 
Heidelberg plant of Renault some 450 people 
produce about 40 vehicles per day, on a job- 
cycle time of about 15 minutes. The division 
of labour and the de-skilling of the worker 
tend to go together with two effects:
(i) The education level of new employees is 
lowered, thereby broadening the unskilled 
base from which the employer can find “spare 
parts” to labour on the assembly line.
(ii) The more these processes occur the wider 
the scope for the introduction of industrial 
robots.
Skill and responsibility
At the same time, there is a contradictory 
tendency :  the  c o m p a n ie s ’ m a rk e t in g  
strategies, in widening the range of vehicles 
and increasing the number of options 
available, mean that in any one eight-hour 
shift a line worker could be required to install 
quite different items of equipment on to one 
of several basic vehicle models. Hence there is 
an increasing need for alertness and flexibility 
on the part of the employee, and in these 
circumstances the VBU, the union which has 
coverage of most of the workers in the 
industry, has been successful in having the 
F ed e ra l  C o n c i l ia t io n  and  A rb i t r a t io n  
Commission (CAC) accept the argument that 
such factors have “required increased skill 
and responsibility in the work of assemblers, 
w e l d e r s  a n d  m e t a l  f i n i s h e r s ” . 3
With the introduction of a new model the 
employees experience the following three 
phases of the drive to achieve the target with 
each phase producing its own particular 
pressures: phase 1, the drive for volume; 
phase 2, the drive for quality; phase 3 the drive 
for efficiency.
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Initially the work force has to learn how the 
new model goes together and what the parts 
look like. During this learning period the 
main requirement is to see that completed 
vehicles come off the line, that is, “to get 
volume”.
As the new model is introduced the 
foremen/forewomen will be required to work 
out how the work of their sections can be 
performed and how many employees they’ll 
need to do it. While car bodies are coming 
down the line it will be the task of the leading 
hands to instruct the line workers how to do 
their respective jobs. If the line workers d o n ’t 
speak English (or the language of the leading 
hand) then the instruction proceeds by way of 
signs and gestures. There are many workers in 
the industry who speak little or no English. 
The VBU has been concerned about the issue 
and has been pressing the vehicle companies 
for the past five years to provide paid time off 
work for employees to learn English. The 
companies continue to refuse the claim. It was 
only last year that agreement was reached 
and then with only some of the companies, 
that international safety symbols be used in 
Australian vehicle plants. Apart from the 
importance of English for safe-working, let 
alone the essentially human aspect of being 
able to speak to, and understand the people 
around you, the multiplicity of vehicle 
options now available means that the cars 
coming down the line won’t all be exactly the 
same. The particular differences will need to 
be read by the line-worker from the 
computer-printed job  card attached to each 
car. An inability to read English could mean 
that a foreman/ woman would have to re­
allocate his/her staff and perhaps upset work 
routines and work relationships that have 
taken some time to develop. If the 
forem an/wom an has no English-reading 
employee who can be switched he/ she will try 
to obtain one from another section. But 
employees are often reluctant to go to a new 
section in surroundings that are new to them 
under the control of supervisors they may not 
know. Perhaps more importantly, they will be 
required to achieve almost immediately, and 
maintain for the entire shift, the level of
output of the other workers in front of and 
behind them in the production process. While 
for some employees, being switched to a new 
job, perhaps in a different section, would be a 
welcome relief, for others it only adds to the 
pressure and is therefore resisted.
Whereas in phase 1 the object is to obtain 
finished vehicles, during phase 2 much more 
attention is paid to the quality to the finish 
produced. Phase 3, the drive for “efficiency” is 
the speed-up phase. This is the period when 
the time-and-motion-study men arrive at the 
shop floor with stopwatch in hand. Their task 
is to reduce the number of employees without 
losing volume or quality. To call it efficiency 
is a bad joke. Assuming corporate optimism 
about the trend of vehicle sales, corporate 
profits depend on two main factors: 1) having 
the productive capacity to meet demand; 2) 
reducing costs of production wherever 
possible.
Productive capacity cannot be achieved 
overnight. There are long lead times involved 
in the design, construction, testing, and 
installation of new production equipment. 
Any particular plant management might not 
be able to do much about updating the plant’s 
productive capacity; such expenditure might 
have to take its place in the global carve-up of 
corporate funds. But where the local 
management can make its contribution to 
global profit is in reducing the labour content 
of its cost of production. In other words, 
they’re stuck with the plant but they can 
off-load the workers! And tha t’s where the 
time-and-motion-study people come in.
Reducing the cost of production is not 
confined to them. In the design departments 
of the corporation, engineers are continually 
searching for ways to use less labour and less 
capital in the production of a car. And they 
are successful. When Chrysler’s Valiant was 
in full production at the Tonsley Park plant in 
Adelaide in the 1960s it was taking something 
of the order of 70 hours to produce a complete 
car. As the fuel crisis began to bite and buyers 
showed an increasing preference for smaller 
four-cylinder cars Chrysler began to produce
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the Centura, then the Sigma, from the same 
plant. But the materials used in production 
and the way they could be assembled meant 
that the Sigma could be produced in 
approximately 25 hours. Production time for 
the Colt is expected to go down to 19l/i hours. 
By being in the plant for less time, each 
completed vehicle in 1981 uses much less of 
the manufacturer’s capital stock and labour 
than it did in 1965. The jobs are simpler and 
can be done much more quickly.
Ill
In an assembly plant there is a marked 
contrast between the situations faced by those 
working on moving production lines and 
those faced by the skilled tradesmen such as 
electricians and fitters who maintain the 
plant. The contrast is especially evident where 
these latter employees are involved in 
modifications to tooling.
The need for such modifications will 
u sua lly  becom e ev iden t th ro u g h  the 
inspection system which will reveal, for 
example, some unsatisfactory fit between 
body panels, involving the assembler on the 
line in spending more than the allotted time 
for the job, thus crowding the employee on 
the next work station. A white-collar 
d raughtsm an/w om an and a blue-collar fitter 
would soon be put onto the job; a 
forem an/wom an would not normally be 
present. In the interests of keeping close 
control over the work of each employee and 
thereby ensuring that the work was being 
done  as eff ic ien tly  as poss ib le  the 
forem an/wom an could, of course, instruct 
the skilled workers to do the job  in a certain 
way. The responsibility for it would shift then 
to the forem an/w om an leaving the workers 
with little freedom to plan.
The degree of freedom has important 
im p lic a t io n s  fo r  b o th  em ployee  and  
employer. For the employee it allows him /her 
to put h is/her own order onto his/her own 
particular job, to exhibit to himself/herself at 
least h is/her particular skills. The job  is 
h is/her domain and he/ she is the controller in 
that domain. This is in marked contrast to 
h is/her role as servant in any other relations
he/she has with the employer. The role of 
servant, the do-as-you’re-told role, is clear 
from the moment he/she walks past the 
employer’s security guard at the gate as 
he/she enters the plant in the morning.
From  the time he/she punches the Bundy 
clock he/she is “theirs” to do with as “they” 
please. Never mind the purpose of what 
he/she is asked to do, never mind whether or 
not it makes sense, just do it. “Their” plant, 
“their” rules. But his/her job , h is/her rules. 
T h a t’s different!
Perhaps this is hardly worth becoming 
excited about. After all, when the fitter lifts 
h is/her head he/she will be aware again that 
he/ she is in a plant of a multi-national vehicle 
producer and his/her degree of freedom will 
appear pitifully small. Nevertheless, as shown 
earlier, it will be more than the production 
line worker has!
IV
For the employer, any freedom the 
employee has in the doing of the job  lessens 
the employer’s control over the operation of 
the entire plant. From the employer’s point of 
view the employee might, in exercising 
h is/her degree of freedom, actually perform 
his /her job  in the least costly way but on the 
other hand he/ she might not. The uncertainty 
surrounding the question can be lowered by 
re d u c in g  the  am ount of w o rk  and  
constraining the kin d  of work the employee is 
required to perform. This implies both the 
substitution of machine tools for human 
labour and the simplification of production 
machinery so that defective parts are not 
repaired but are simply scrapped and 
replaced. Taking the above course might not 
be the least costly from the employer’s point 
of view but it does increase the predictability 
of, and thus the employer’s control over, the 
plant-wide operation. The implications of 
predictability for budgeting, for materials 
supply, for production scheduling, for 
delivery of finished vehicles to new-car 
salesrooms and ultimately for cash flow and 
for profit are obviously important.
A side  f ro m  the t e c h n ic a l /e c o n o m ic
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implications considered above there are 
industrial/ political implications of employees 
having any freedom to move about the plant, 
which are even more important to the 
employer. Such freedom could be the basis on 
which events such as lunch-time union mass 
meetings are organised, and from which could 
flow interruptions to production far more 
serious and far more unpredictable than any 
deriving from the technical considerations 
mentioned earlier. The experience gained by 
the workers in engaging in on-the-job 
collective action is invaluable in shaping the 
way they handle future industrial problems 
with the employer. The employer, of course, 
realises this and does whatever he/she can do 
prevent such experience being gained.
V
The “Gnatenko case” illustrates some of the 
points from the previous sections. Fedor 
(Ted) Gnatenko, at the time of the incident 
described below was a tool-maker at GM H, 
Elizabeth, South Australia, and had been 
employed by the company for over 20 years. 
He was sacked on 20 November 1974 for 
taking part in an unauthorised union meeting 
at the plant on the same day. As with most 
industrial disputes this d idn’t arise “out of the 
blue” but was one of the more visible 
manifestations of a continuing series of 
events.
The principal element in the situation was 
probably the fact that in the latter half of 1974 
motor vehicle sales were sluggish. By the 
middle of October, Elizabeth workers 
reckoned GM H had 40,000 vehicles “on the 
grass”. In these circumstances one obvious 
move would have been for the company to 
lay-off production workers. While this had 
often been done in the industry, it was a move 
which always brought much political 
disfavour and soured relations with the 
unions, both officially and at the plant-floor. 
A better move from the com pany’s point of 
view would have been for some group of 
workers to go on strike. But how can an 
employer precipitate a strike? Sacking a 
leading shop-floor activist is one way. The 
strike (which would be almost certain to
follow) would provide the pretext for laying- 
off a large number of workers. This way the 
blame would be shifted and, moreover, 
another opportunity would be created to set 
the unions squabbling amongst themselves. 
This was the better strategy, but to analyse it 
requires some understanding of the pattern of 
u n io n i s m  in th e  i n d u s t r y  a n d  th e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  f o r m s  o f  c o n f l i c t  
accommodation created by the State. Thus 
we will be looking at the situation at three 
inter-penetrating levels: the relations in 
production4 relations between the union 
organisations and the industrial arbitration 
bodies.
Ted Gnatenko
The company had plenty of scope for a 
sacking: some 1500 workers had attended the 
November 20 meeting and of course 
Gnatenko was amongst them. He was unique. 
As convenor of the AM WU shop-stewards he 
was co-ordinator of stewards activities in a 
union which organised at the shop level 
around a strong shop-stewards system. His 20 
years of working for the company, his 
continuous involvement in union activities 
both on and off the job  and his some-time 
membership of the Communist Party of 
Australia meant he was a man of considerable 
relevant experience. Being convenor of the 
AMWU brought him into contact with shop- 
stewards of other unions on the job and 
amonst them and their members he was 
widely-known, popular and highly respected. 
In addition, his being Bulgarian by birth with 
a fluency in several languages made him 
someone who could, and did, communicate 
with many of the foreign-born workers who 
made up the bulk of the assembly-line work­
force.
So from the com pany’s point of view 
Gnatenko’s sacking could have been expected 
to produce a strike by certain key workers. It 
was more than possible, too, that, by making 
Gnatenko the target, his standing in the shop 
would lead to strong feelings by the VBU 
production workers and members of the other 
trades’ unions, that they should show 
solidarity with the AM W U and go out too. 
Moreover, if his sacking could be made to
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stick the company would be well rid of a most 
capable unionist.
The second element in the situation points 
up the complexity of inter-union relations 
and the tensions with which the workers at the 
plant had to deal; nevertheless it is difficult to 
estimate the degree to which events were 
influenced by it. In March 1974 tool-and- 
cutter grinders, members of the Australasian 
Society of Engineers (ASE) and the AMWU 
employed by G M H at Fishermen’s Bend in 
Victoria, struck for about a month in support 
of a claim for increased wages. In 
consequence, VBU members on production 
in the Body Assembly division at Elizabeth 
were stood-down for about three weeks. 
During May and June members of the 
Electrical Trades Union (ETU) at Elizabeth 
struck for about six weeks in support of a 
wage claim. Again VBU members at 
Elizabeth were stood down, this time for 
about four weeks. In other words, VBU 
members lost seven weeks pay because ot 
disputes they were not involved in and from 
which they could receive no benefit.
Following these events some VBU officials 
began agitating for a closed shop agreement, 
ie that all workshop employees should be 
members of the VBU. When the Gnatenko 
sacking took place it would have been 
reasonable to expect that at the very least 
there would have been a plant-wide strike of 
AMWU members. Again VBU members 
would have been stood down and again would 
have lost money. The Gnatenko sacking 
involved the important issue of victimisation. 
Nevertheless it is possible that some VBU 
officials were keen to be rid of a situation in 
which, with their union the biggest in the 
industry and potentially the most powerful, it 
was seen to be, particularly by the members, 
the most quiescent. One way to bring this to a 
head, which would have led to very 
substantial financial and other long-term 
gains for the VBU, would have been to let the 
expected AM W U strike over Gnatenko run 
its course. At its conclusion VBU officials 
would use the lost wages of their members to 
mobilise a VBU strike around the demand
that the company recognise the VBU as the 
sole union in the industry, and until that was 
achieved there would be no return to work.
The third element in the series of events 
surrounding Gnatenko’s sacking is more 
directly tied in to the com pany’s production 
planning. The workers at Elizabeth had 
become concerned at what they understood to 
be a company decision to phase-out 
production of the Australian-made Torana 
and launch instead a Japanese-made car, the 
Gemini. The vehicle would be manufactured 
in Japan  and imported to Australia in a 
completed knocked down (CKD) form, ready 
for local assembly. From normally reliable 
sources in senior management the workers 
reckoned that, across Australia, 5000 
employees would lose their jobs if the 
com pany’s plans went ahead. Gnatenko was 
quoted as saying that “ 1000 workers might go 
from Elizabeth”.5 On this issue the company 
had done nothing to allay the workers’ fears. 
Rather than scotch the rumours altogether, 
its officials told a meeting of Elizabeth 
shop-stewards that “only 15,000cars” 6 would 
be imported, not 50,000 as the workers 
thought. In addition, they gave “only vague 
replies to union enquiries concerning 
employment after Christmas”.7 
Plant Committee
It was against the foregoing background 
th a t  the C o m b in ed  S h o p  S te w a rd s ’ 
Committee representing members of the 
VBU, the Federated Engine Drivers and 
Firemen’s Association (FED FA ) and the 
AMWU called a lunch-time meeting of all 
members on November 20th to discuss the 
e m p l o y m e n t  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  
introduction of the Gemini. About 1500 
workers turned up to the lawn area within the 
plant, the place where mass meetings were 
usually held. Also present were officials of 
both the VBU and the AMW U. Before the 
meeting Gnatenko was warned by a company 
official that if the meeting were to take place 
he would face serious consequences; he was 
requested to call the meeting off. His response 
was that the decision to hold the meeting was 
made by more than 50 stewards on the shop 
committee (of which he was but one) and any
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decision to cancel would have to be taken by 
either that committee or the mass meeting 
itself. It went ahead and the first item of 
business was a report on the com pany’s 
warning to Gnatenko; the second was the 
question of where the rest of the meeting 
should be held.
It was moved and seconded from the floor 
and unanimously decided that the meeting 
should proceed forthwith right where it was. 
After some discussion the meeting adjourned 
without any decision being reached. At 3.30 
that same afternoon Gnatenko was sacked. 
The following morning an 8 am stopwork 
meeting of the A M W U ’s 400 members at 
Elizabeth decided to stop work for 24 hours in 
protest. For the unions involved the issue was 
serious since it could flow to all G M H ’s 
operations in Australia.
It put the workers at Elizabeth, and more 
particularly the AM W U members, in a 
powerful, but politically and industrially 
difficult, position. Nevertheless the support of 
the A M W U ’s official apparatus for the shop 
committee was strong with the SA state 
secretary, John  Scott, asserting, following the 
24-hour strike, that “the shop committee 
would be organising whatever follow-up 
action was required”.8 Nevertheless the 
matter was not left entirely with them. Two 
days after the sacking Scott filed an 
application in the South Australian Industrial 
Commission for G natenko’s reinstatement 
and engaged a QC to present the case. On the 
same day the union held a lunchtime meeting 
of its 200 members at the com pany’s 
Woodville, Adelaide plant. By this time the 
Minister for Labour and Industry in South 
Australia, M r McKee, had said publicly that 
he hoped Gnatenko would be reinstated and 
that “it (was) natural for people in the 
industry to want to discuss matters 
concerning their future, and one would not 
have expected the company to take such 
drastic action over a lunchtime meeting in 
view of the problems confronting the 
industry”.9
The com pany’s position was clear too; the 
union had been told that “Gnatenko would 
not be reinstated in any circumstances”.10 The
com pany’s response to the union application 
was to apply to the Supreme Court for an 
order prohibiting the S.A. Industrial 
Commission from hearing the matter. The 
order was duly given on 21 January 1975 by 
Chief Justice Bray who referred the matter to 
the Full Court. Bray’s order was met with an 
immediate walk off the job  by 20 AM W U 
stewards at Elizabeth who met at the union’s 
city office the following morning and then 
demonstrated outside the Supreme Court. 
They sent the following resolution to Bray:
This emergency meeting of the G M H  
Elizabeth A M W U  shop stewards com m ­
ittee, meeting with the full approval 
o f  th e  S t a t e  C o u n c i l ,  r e g i s t e r s  its 
s t ro n g  p r o t e s t  a t  th e  a c t io n  th a t  
G M H  management has decided to take 
to prevent the case of the dismissed 
A M W U  convenor Ted Gnatenko being 
heard by the State Industrial C om m ­
ission. On m a n y  occas io n s  an d  in 
relation to many issues in the past 
re p re se n ta t iv e s  o f  G M H  m a n a g e m e n t  
have urged us to take our case to arbit­
ration. On this issue, when that is pre­
cisely what we have done, the company is 
demonstrating its hypocrisy by taking every 
legal step to prevent the case from being 
heard and the question resolved speedily.11
Direct action
It was two months before the Full Court 
heard the matter and when it did, on 27th 
March, it decided in favour of GMH. With 
that decision AM W U members at Elizabeth
and Woodville re-introduced an industrial 
tactic they had used so successfully betore — 
the “guerilla” strike.12 The direct action began 
on Wednesday, 9th April, when 22 workers 
from the maintenance, jig, body and welding 
sections at Elizabeth went out at noon on 
what they said was an indefinite strike. At 2 
pm that same day 12 workers in the tool 
sharpening area at Woodville walked off the 
job. Contrary to expectations strikers from
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both plants returned to work the following 
m o rn in g .  On th e  10th A pril ,  th ree  
maintenance fitters walked off the job  at 
Elizabeth when two assembly lines broke 
down. The company thereupon stood down 
130 production workers (VBU members) and 
had no idea when the conveyors might be 
repaired. The fitters decided to do repairs on 
the night shift of the same day so the Vehicle 
Assembly Plant (VAP) could begin work at 
the normal starting time of 7.30 am the next 
day. A joint meeting of stewards from the 
VBU, AM W U and F E D F A  was held on the 
10th April and endorsed the metal workers’ 
actions. While all these actions were being 
discussed and decided on at the shopfloor 
level, the State branches of the various unions 
were indicating their support. For example, 
the walk-off by the three AMW SU 
maintenance fitters on 10th led to the 
company’s approaching the VBU to see 
whether that union would allow any of its 
fitter members on night shift to do repairs 
normally done by AM W U men. The VBU 
refused and the VBU State executive pledged 
its support and endorsed the actions of the 
AM W U in its efforts to get Gnatenko 
reinstated. The State officials of the ASE, the 
rival union to the AMW U, also rejected the 
com pany’s approach.
Shop-floor action
In the face of this build-up of shop-floor 
action and inter-union support the company 
continued to maintain its November 1974 
firmness. Notices posted in the Elizabeth 
plant on the 10th April said: “The company 
has again advised the AM W U that it will not 
enter into any discussion regarding the re­
instatement of M r Gnatenko.”13
As the dispute proceeded the workers at the 
shop-floor continued to disrupt production. 
They were not prepared to be fobbed off by 
company declarations that it would not talk. 
They had won against similar attitudes by 
GM H in the past. They also knew that as this 
struggle moved into the courtroom and out of 
their hands, it would be particularly 
important to let their feelings be known. 
There is considerable feeling throughout 
much of Australia’s trade union movement
that decisions in court rooms reflect the 
power struggle in the office or plant. This is 
not to say that decisions of Industrial Courts 
or Commissions are irrelevant — far from it! 
It is rather to acknowledge that, often, justice 
is a matter of power. The aim of the shop- 
floor disruption was to get the company to 
talk. At the time of the Gnatenko sacking 
there existed in the Award a stand-down 
clause which provided that “The Company 
shall have the right to deduct payment for any 
day an  employee cannot be usefully employed 
because of a strike or through a breakdown in 
machinery or a stoppage of work by any cause 
for which the Company cannot reasonably be 
held responsible”.14
Lightning strikes
This could have been expected to be a brake 
on industrial action but, in practice, as the 
following section makes clear, the workers at 
the shop floor found a way around the clause. 
The main tactic was the short-duration, on- 
the-job, lightning strike first in one section of 
the plant then in another; as one group 
resumed work another would stop. A typical 
incident would be as follows: the four VBU 
members spot welding in the side-gates 
section would fail to resume work after the 
morning tea break and would stay off the job 
for about two hours, ie at 11.30 am they 
would re-appear, pick 'up their welding guns 
and set to work. While they were off the job 
their workmates down-the-line from them 
could continue to work until stocks were 
exhausted and then they would stop too. 
When the welders returned perhaps two or 
three painters in the spray painting booth 
would leave the job, and the line feeding them 
would have to stop. The production 
superintendent had no idea which section 
would be on strike next, for how long or how 
many employees would be involved. Because 
those who were on strike, and those who had 
no materials to work with did not actually 
leave the plant they were able to circulate 
amongst the other workers and tell them what 
was happening. All this added to the high 
level of co-ordination between the shop 
stewards in the various sections and made for 
the constant monitoring and review of the
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situation by the workers. The effects of this 
sort of industrial action on production were 
severe. Although this form of action had been 
determined by the combined shop committee 
involving both production and maintenance 
workers, it did not lend itself wholly to 
centralised co-ordination by the combined 
shop committee executive. The VBU stewards 
were m uch  m ore  fa m il ia r  th a n  the 
maintenance stewards with the way the 
process of production was integrated, and 
therefore knew the strategic points, and so 
they were given the authority of the combined 
shop committee to plan and set the strikes in 
motion.
Thirty per cent Over-award
This form of action was not new to the 
workers at Elizabeth. In the early 1970s they 
had launched a campaign to force GM H t o  
convert the existing over-award payments, 
into an all-purpose rate and to remove all the 
penalties attached to these over-award 
payments.15 This campaign became known as 
the 30 per cent over-award campaign, and the 
series of lightning stoppages resulted in not 
one completed vehicle coming off the 
assembly line for the whole of one working 
week. Vehicles came off the line, on wheels, 
with engines in, but each one had parts 
missing, enough to prevent it going to the 
dealer’s sale room. In this period the lightning 
strikes were being staged all over the plant but 
the particular circumstances of each work 
section required that tactics be tailored to 
suit. For example, in the VAP the situation 
was different from other sections, because 
there, bodies could be stockpiled off the line 
on trolleys and could be pushed onto the line 
if there was an interruption to production in 
the body building area or the paint shop, for 
example. This meant the VAP could be kept 
going independently of these other lines. 
Because the VAP was working two shifts at 
this time, ie a day and an afternoon shift, there 
was every chance that the workers on day shift 
could deplete the entire stock of bodies thus 
making it unnecessary for the workers on the 
afternoon shift to clock on. It was here, 
especially, that the workers were in danger of 
giving the company the chance to use the
stand-down clause.
As mentioned above, if, at the time a new 
shift was to begin, there were insufficient 
materials available to keep the shift going for 
the eight hours, the company could decline to 
start them. The stewards in the other shops 
therefore had to ensure that on any particular 
day, there was enough body stock available 
for the VAP afternoon shift to start and in 
addition, if they put on a lightning strike, 
there would still be enough stock for the 
following day’s day-shift to start. This all 
required a good knowledge of the production 
process and a nice balance between the needs 
of stock buildup and the effects of industrial 
action. But they did it, for a week — 
everybody employed and no saleable vehicles 
produced! The workers who engaged in the 
lightning strikes had their wages docked by 
the company but on-the-job collections fixed 
that. Ultimately the campaign had the desired 
effect; the 1974 G M H  Award set a new 
standard in wages. The arbitrary nature of 
wage elements such as merit money and 
attendance bonus was eliminated by being 
written into the Award. No longer were these 
payments tied to whether or not the employee 
had kept h is/her nose clean with the 
foreman/woman. As such payments were 
formerly approximately 30 per cent of the 
weekly wage, to have them assured was a 
significant gain.
A shop-floor campaign
This campaign was important because it 
was initiated by workers at the shop-floor. 
The full-time officials soon came in behind it 
but because they did not actually work in the 
industry and therefore were not subject to the 
arbitrariness of the penalties they quite mis­
read the feeling of the membership in the run­
up to the 1974 Award negotiations. Whereas 
officials were pressing for Award wage 
increases in their discussions with the 
membership as to what should be in the log of 
claims, the membership was insisting that a 
priority claim was that the penalties had to go.
It was with this sort of experierce behind 
them that the workers at Elizabeth launched
SHOP-FLOOR ORGANISATION 19
into their industrial action to have Gnatenko 
reinstated. They realised it would be a battle 
of wits as to whether or not they would lay 
themselves open to the com pany’s use of the 
stand-down clause. They realised it was just 
another weapon in the com pany’s industrial 
arsenal, which, like all the rest, would be used 
to divide, intimidate, cajole, entice or reward 
the workers and could be used whether or not 
the company had alternative work available. 
As can be seen from the 30 per cent campaign 
the shop floor workers demonstrated a 
com p reh en s iv e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  the 
production process and could be expected to 
offer an informed view of any company claim 
about available work. The acting secretary of 
the VBU at the time, Mr D Foreman, referred 
to  th e  s t a n d - d o w n  c l a u s e ’s c o n t r o l  
implications when on Friday, 11th April, he 
announced, with respect to the stand-down of 
130 workers on the previous day, “the union 
members dispute the company’s claim that 
they cou ld  no t  have been gain fu lly  
employed”.16 Foreman was giving notice 
that tne union would be lodging a claim in the 
Arbitration Commission for payment for the 
time stood down.
At this stage Mr Laurie Carmichael 
(Assistant National Secretary of the AM WU) 
asked M r Clyde Cameron (then Federal 
Minister for Labour) to arrange for a member 
of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission (CAC), to be made available to 
bring the parties together. Bringing in the 
Federal Government did make it that much 
more difficult for the company to continue to 
refuse to talk and siting the discussions in the 
CAC was consistent with the company’s 
original contention that the SA Industrial 
Commission had no jurisdiction and that the 
CAC was the appropriate forum.
T h e  p r o c e e d i n g s  b e g a n  b e f o r e  
Commissioner Clarkson in Adelaide on 
Monday, 14 April 1975, and continued for 
five days. On the Monday Clarkson directed 
G M H “to reconsider its refusal to discuss 
(Gnatenko’s) re-instatement”.17 On the 
following day more than 300 AMWU 
members at Elizabeth walked off the job  at 
8.30 am for a 24-hour strike, many of them
going to the CAC hearing to witness 
proceedings. On the Friday Clarkson varied 
the G M H  Award so as to enable employees 
covered by that Award to come under the re­
in s ta te m e n t  p ro v is ions  of  the  S o u th  
Australian Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act. 18 The variation was made 
retrospective to November 1st of the previous 
year, ie before Gnatenko was sacked. Two 
and a half weeks later, on May 8th, GM H 
appealed, and the very next day the A M W U ’s 
shop stewards in Elizabeth held a lunchtime 
meeting to discuss what they would do next.
Closer organisation
The recent events had broadened the 
dispute, and the unions were quick to see that 
Clarkson’s decision applied not only to 
Gnatenko but represented a significant 
advance for all G M H ’s employees. It 
constituted a turning point in that now all 
employees stood to lose if the com pany’s 
application was successful. Stewards from the 
VBU and FED FA  joined with AM W U 
stewards in a meeting a lunch-time on the 
following Monday, 12th May, outside the 
plant gates. In other words, at the shop-floor 
level workers from those three unions were 
moving back into a com bined  form of 
organisation. The lunch-time stewards’ 
meeting decided to send a delegation of 
stewards from th£ three unions to tell 
company officers that, because of the appeal 
being lodged, they could expect lightning 
strikes. The strikes followed while the 
newspapers were given, and published the 
Unions’case. Subsequently (March, 1976) the 
High Court rejected the G M H  appeal.
The purpose of this account has been to 
show some of the details of the day-to-day 
s i t u a t i o n  o f  b o th  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  
maintenance workers in the vehicle industry. 
The details will differ from plant to plant and 
company to company and will bear the marks 
of particular individuals but, by and large, the 
size of plants, the number of people involved, 
the pressure of work and, particularly, the 
way the workforce is controlled, all operate 
to produce the kind of effects described.
Cases like Gnatenko’s or a 30 per cent
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c am p a ig n  d o n ’t bob  up every  day , 
nevertheless there is almost always some 
industrial matter at issue in the plant. Even 
for these smaller issues the workers are better 
able to handle them if they have some form of 
shop-floor organisation, some group of 
colleagues to whom, on the job, they can turn 
for advice and support, some group of 
co lleagues  in w hom  can  reside the 
accumulated wisdom of the p lant’s industrial 
experiences. A Gnatenko case makes the need 
for such an organisation even more 
compelling.
The ability and the preparedness of the 
shop-floor organisation to plan and act was 
the principal reason the Gnatenko sacking 
d idn’t stick. Another significant reason for 
the workers’ success was the extent to which 
the union officials supported the Elizabeth 
workers.
The implications of the situation of the
NOTES
1 The writer is indebted to many people. In particular
to Albert and Gloria Laird whose determination 
to fight has been an inspiration; to Bob 
Connell for encouragement and patience; 
to Dominic Forem an, Ted G natenko, 
Dick G roz ie r ,  the AM W SU  vehicle- 
in d u s t ry  shop s tew ards  in A dela ide , 
and especially to Brian Mowbray.
2 The information was gained over several
years by visits to nine vehicle-manufacturing 
or assembly plants in Australia, discussion 
with shop-floor workers and management 
personnel in the plants, off-the-job discussions- 
with officials of the Amalgamated Metal 
Workers’ Union (AMWU) which, after its 
amalgamation with the Federated Shipwrights’ 
and Ship Constructors’ Association of Australia, 
became the Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and 
Shipwrights’ Union (AMWSU).
Elizabeth workers are highly significant. An 
industrial struggle throws light on facets of 
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